We use concepts of continuous higher randomness, developed in [BGM], to investigate Π 1 1 randomness. We discuss lowness for Π 
Background
Mathematical objects often have a general definition which has no regard for any method or procedure that can describe it. For instance, a function is defined as an arbitrary correspondence between objects, but nothing in the definition requires that we are given a way to construct the correspondence. Nonetheless, when the modern definition of functions (often credited to Dirichlet) appeared, c The Author(s) 2017. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/¡), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
it was obvious that all the actual functions that were studied in practice were determined by simple analytic expressions, such as explicit formulas or infinite series.
In the early days of logic, some mathematicians tried to delineate the functions which could be defined by such accepted methods and they searched for their characteristic properties, presumably nice properties not shared by all functions. Baire was first to introduce in his thesis [Bai99] what we now call Baire functions, the smallest set which contains all continuous functions and is closed under the taking of (pointwise) limits. His work was then pursued by Lebesgue [Leb05] , who initiated the first systematic study of definable functions. According to Moschovakis [Mos87], Lebesgue's paper truly started the subject of descriptive set theory.
At the time, the modern notions of computability and definability were yet to appear, but we can see, through the work of Borel, Baire and Lebesgues, the necessity of giving a precise meaning to the intuition we have of objects we can "describe" or "understand". A couple of years later, Gödel's work around his incompleteness theorems constituted a key step leading to the understanding of what is a computable object and to the understanding of definability in general. This work was then pursued in the thirties, by Church with Lambda calculus, and by Turing with his eponymous machine. The modern notion of computable function was made clear and researchers were soon convinced of the rather philosophical following statement, known as the Turing-Church thesis : "A function is computable (using any of the numerous possible equivalent mathematical definitions) if and only if its values can be found by some purely mechanical process".
Let us now go back to the early days of descriptive set theory. The study of the hierarchy of functions initiated by Baire and pursued by Lebesgue naturally led to the notion of Borel sets. One goal here was again to refine the very general definition of sets (say of reals) in order to work with objects we can understand and describe. The notion of Borel sets takes care of one aspect of sets complexity, their complexity with respect to their "shape" : The sets of reals with simplest shape complexity are the open sets (Σ 0 1 sets) and their complement, the closed sets (Π 0 1 sets). The first ones are merely unions of interval and the second ones complements of unions of interval. We then obtain sets of higher and higher complexity by taking countable unions or countable intersections of sets of lower complexity. We obtain a hierarchy of sets, each of them having nice properties, such as for instance being measurable or having the Baire property. However, this hierarchy of complexity is still unsatisfactory, because even a set of simple shape, like an open set, can be very complex from the viewpoint of effectiveness: a set may be open, but there may be no way to describe the intervals which compose it. Kleene, a student of Church, reintroduced computability in the study of Borel sets. We now want to work only with open sets that can be described in some effective way. Then when we consider a countable intersection or a countable union, we also want to be able to describe in some effective way which sets take part in this union or intersection. This led to the very nice and beautiful theory of effectively Borel sets, and of effectively analytic and co-analytic sets, which constitute one of the main material of this paper.
Computability and definability could be used successfully in the study of sets of reals. But they were primarily designed to study sets of integers. Interestingly, the effective sets of reals proved themselves useful to conduct a study of the sets of integers which are far from being describable or understandable as single objects. This is the purpose of, for instance, algorithmic randomness. This field tries to resolve an apparent paradox that probability theory is helpless with: If one flip a fair coin twenty times in a row, a result like this 01001011011010101110 will seem rather "normal", whereas a result like this one : 00000000000000000000 will appear as non-random and extraordinary, to the point that one would probably check if the coin is valid. However, these two outcomes have the same probability of occurrence. So why one of them seems more random than the other one? It is simply because one is hard to describe whereas the other one is simple to describe. This is an extreme case, and it is not always the case that strings which seem non-random (with respect to a fair-coin fliping) are simple to describe. Consider for instance a long string with twice more 0's than 1's, but chaotic enough with regards to any other aspect you could think of. This string is not necessarily simple to describe, but it belongs to a small set that is simple to describe : the set of strings with twice more 0's than 1's, which has small measure by the concentration inequalities, like the Chernoff bounds. The mathematical formalization of this idea was a long process throughout the 20 th century, started by Kolmorogov and Solomonov [Sol64, Kol65] . Martin-Löf was the first, in 1966 [ML66] , to use the above paradigm to define randomness of infinite binary sequences: such a sequence is random if it belongs to no set of measure 0, for a given class of set which should be describable in some way. Whichever notion of "being describable" is used, the only requirement is that at most countably many sets are describable for this notion. This way the set of randoms still has measure one, by the countable additivity of measures.
There are other approaches to the study of sets of integers which are typical. In 1966 Cohen showed that the continuum hypothesis was independent of the standard axioms of set theory (ZFC). To do so he devised his famous forcing method, which should latter have numerous various applications in mathematical logic in general. The first example of forcing given by Cohen is forcing with the dense open sets in a countable model of ZFC. With respect to that forcing, a set of integers is called Cohen generic if it belongs to none of the meagre sets definable in the model. Just as countable additivity of measures is used to ensure that the set of random elements has measure 1, here we use the fact that in a Baire space, a countable union of meagre sets is still a meagre set. Therefore the sets of generic elements is co-meagre. The study of Cohen generics was latter pursued by several authors [Joc80, Kur82, Kur83] , by lowering the effective complexity of meagre sets which are used: We do not consider all the meagre sets in a countable model of ZFC, but only some of them. We can for instance keep only the closed sets of empty interior whose complement can be enumerated by a Turing machines. There are a lot of similarities between Cohen generics and random sequences. This is because Cohen generics are for category theory what randoms are for measure theory: in both case we have a notion of "small set", for randomness a set is small if it has measure 0 and for categoricity a set is small if it is meagre. Also in both case we declare an element "typical" if it belongs to no small set among a countable selection of them.
This paper deals with both randomness and genercity at certain various levels of effectiveness or describability. We mainly deal with what is called Π 1 -randomness goes back to Sacks [Sac90] and Kechris [Kec75] , and it started to be studied formally by Hjorth and Nies [HN07] . It is a notion of interest because of some remarkable properties shared with no other randomness notion. For instance there is a largest Π 1 1 set of measure 0. This notion was so far not very well understood, and we unveil in this paper most of its mysteries. Our work provides insight about its inner mechanisms: Π 1 1 -randomness becomes with this paper a well understood notion. As for Σ 1 1 -genericity, the notion was at first built by the authors to mimic on the categorical side the phenomenons that occur on the measure theoretical side with Π 1 1 -randomness. We conduct a study of various genericity notions lying next to Σ 1 1 -genericity, and we show that it has a lot of similarities with Π 1 1 -randomness.
Introduction
Interest in Π 1 1 -randomness comes from both above and below. From "above", effective descriptive set theory attempts to understand the computable content of basic facts about definable sets of real numbers. Lightface investigations shed new light on classical results; for an example we can take Spector's proof of the measurabiliy of Π 1 1 sets, originally established by Lusin. The ordinal analysis of Π 1 1 sets allows us to consider them as being in some sense enumerable. For sets of natural numbers, this is made precise by using admissible computability over L ω ck 1 . Of course measure plays a central role in descriptive set theory, and so null Π 1 1 sets are a natural object to study.
From "below", investigation of higher notions of algorithmic randomness were started by Martin-Löf [ML66] , who considered ∆ 1 1 -randomness, mostly because it satisfies better closure properties than the computably enumerable notion. Sacks (see [Sac90, IV2.5] ) was the first to define the notion of Π 1 1 randomness and show it is distinct from ∆ 1 1 randomness. An important advance in the theory of "higher randomness" was made by Hjorth and Nies in [HN07] . They used the analogy between computably enumerable and Π 1 1 sets of numbers to define higher analogues of notions of algorithmic randomness, the most central being Π 1 1 -ML-randomness. The theory was then further developed by Chong, Nies and Yu [CNY08] , by Chong and Yu [CY] and by Bienvenu, Greenberg and Monin [BGM] .
These contributions enriched various aspects of the theory, but very little was discovered about the key notion of Π 1 1 randomness. This concept is very natural. It is simply defined (avoiding all null Π 1 1 sets), and has a universal test (a greatest null Π 1 1 set); and unlike ML-randomness, the universal test occurs without having to encumber the definition with extra conditions (the speed of convergence of the measure to 0). On the other hand it is a singularity among higher randomness notions, in that it is not the higher analogue of any "lower" notion of randomness: ∆ 1 1 randomness is higher Schnorr randomness, and other notions are direct analgoues: the main one is Π 1 1 -ML randomness, but also higher weak 2 randomness (introduced by Nies [Nie09, 9.2.17], studied by Chong and Yu [CY] and later in [BGM] randomness, lowness and cupping. As mentioned above, there is a greatest null Π 1 1 set (Stern and independently Kechris [Ste75, Kec75] , and later rediscovered in [HN07] ). In fact, this greatest set can be described succinctly. Recall that a sequence is ∆ In this paper we answer the question of lowness for Π 1 1 randomness, first stated in [HN07] . The idea of lowness has been extensively studied in algorithmic randomness: For a given randomness notion Γ, we say that a set X is low for Γ if X cannot de-randomize any Γ-random: every Γ-random is also ΓpXq-random. In particular the class of reals low for ML-randomness has been central in algorithmic randomness, with many equivalent characterisations. The higher analogue of this class was studied in [HN07, BGM] .
Any ∆ 1 1 set is low for Π 1 1 randomness. In this paper (Theorem 4.1) we prove that these are the only ones.
We also consider the question of cupping with Π 1 1 random sequences. A fundamental result in the study of both the local and global Turing degrees is the Posner-Robinson theorem, showing that any noncomputable real can be joined above r I with a 1-generic sequence. The cupping question for incomplete randoms was settled by Day and Miller [DM14] using tools of effective analysis. Their solution gives yet another characterisation of lowness for ML-randomness. Limits on cupping with random sequences were established by Day and Dzhafarov [DD13] .
In the higher setting, Kleene's O, the complete Π Hence for cupping partner for a real A we are searching for a real X which preserves ω ck 1 but such that A X collapses ω ck 1 . Kumabe-Slaman forcing can be used to show that any non-hyperarithmetic real can be non-trivially cupped (for Kumabe-Slaman forcing see [SS99] ). Theorem 2.1 shows that for random sequences, the random cupping partners desired are precisely the Π 1 1 random sequences. We show that any non-hyperarithmetic real can in fact be cupped by a Π 1 1 random sequence (Theorem 4.3).
Continuous higher randomness, and an analogue of Hirschfeldt-Miller.
We use concepts, terminology and notation from [BGM] . The main theme of that paper is the centrality of continuous reductions in algorithmic randomness. Hyperarithmetic reducibility is too coarse for many arguments to go through. A central concept introduced in [BGM] is a higher analogue of Turing reducibility that allows us to lift many arguments to the higher setting. The idea is to take the definition of Turing reducibility in terms of functionals and allow the functionals to be Π 1 1 rather than c.e. We give the details in Section 3 below. Higher Turing reducibility requires any output to be determined by only finitely many bits of the oracle. If an oracle Y collapses ω 1. X forms a minimal pair with r I .
2. X does not compute any noncomputable c.e. set.
3. X is weakly 2 random.
In the higher setting, a modified version (involving enumerating ∆ 2 sets) was shown to characterise the class MLRrOs, which is strictly smaller than the Π 1 1 randoms. For higher weak 2 randomness, or even Π randoms is not Σ 0 3 . As mentioned above, the second author showed later [Mon14] that the set of Π . . .
. . . We can ask two questions:
1. Which null sets in this hierarchy suffice to capture Π . This is not so, by a result in [BGM] (any co-null Π ck 3 set in fact contains a sequence which is not higher weak 2 random). For question (1), in [BGM] it was shown that Π 1 1 randomness is distinct from higher weak 2 randomness, showing that the level Π ck 2 is insufficient. In Section 5 we establish fairly low bounds for both questions : Π Recall that for any lightface pointclass Γ, we say that a sequence G 2 ω is: Our first result here is to capture the precise level of genericity that suffices to preserve ω ck 1 ; this is the category analogue of Monin's result on Π 1 1 randomness. We show that the level is precisely Σ 1 1 -genericity. This notion can be considered as a higher analogue of Π 0 1 -genericity, a notion which Jockusch noticed is equivalent to 2-genricity (see [Kur82] and [Kur83] [HN07] and formally shown in [BGHM] ). In the higher setting we focus on the weight of a set of strings (and see that in several ways it is the more fundamental concept). Recall that for a set of strings W, the weight wtpWq of W is°σ W 2 ¡|σ| . Instead of prefix-free generating sets we obtain sets of weight as close as we like to the measure of the set in question. The technique used in the proof of the following lemma was already used in [BGM, Though we will not use it, we note that an index for W can be obtained uniformly from ε and an index for U.
Proof. Let U be a Π 1 1 set of strings generating U; let xU s y s ω ck 1 be a higher enumeration of U. We can assume that at most one string enters U at each stage: this means that for all s ω ck 1 , U s 1 ¡ U s contains at most one element, and for all limit s ω ck 1 , U s U s t s U t . At a stage s ω ck 1 , if σ enters U s 1 , we find a clopen set C s rσs such that:
We then add a (finite) set of strings generating C s (whose total weight will be λpC s q) 
As a result, we get a characterisation of higher ML-randomness, an analogue of a result of Kučera's [Kuč85] . 
-ML-test).
Suppose that Z is Π 1 1 -ML-random. Let P be Π ck 1 and non-null, and let V be the complement of P. By Lemma 3.1, let V be a Π Here we must note something important. Unlike the usual definitions of "lower" functionals, we do not require that a higher Turing functional is consistent. That is, we do not require that if pσ 0 , n, α 0 q and pσ 1 , n, α 1 q are both in Φ, and σ 0 and σ 1 are compatible, then α 0 α 1 . We thus have to regard ΦpYq as a multivalued function. For f pω
for some higher functional Φ (and say that Y higher computes f ). That is, on the oracle Y we require that Φ gives only consistent answers (and is total), but we do not require that ΦpZq be consistent on other oracles Z. Indeed, in [BGHM] we show that there is a higher ML-random sequence (a Π 1 1 -ML-random) which higher Turing computes O but does not compute it via a functional consistent on all oracles. So the inconsistency cannot be completely removed. However, it can be 'reduced' by as much as we want, in a measure theoretic way; and this will be useful for some results of this paper.
Let us fix some notation. For a functional Φ and an oracle Y we write ΦpY, nqÓ if n dom ΦpYq: that is, at least one value is given. If more than one value is given then we anyway write ΦpY, nq α 0 and ΦpY, nq α 1 . We say that ΦpYq is total if dom ΦpYq ω, that is, if ΦpY, nqÓ for all n. The totality set of Φ is Π ck 2 . The inconsistency set of Φ (the set of Y for which for some n, ΦpY, nq obtains more than one value) is Σ 3. The measure of the inconsistency set of Ψ is smaller than ε.
Further, an index for Ψ can be obtained uniformly from an index for Φ and from ε.
Note that (1) and (2) imply that the correct Φ-computations are unchanged in Ψ: for all Y 2 ω , if ΦpYq is total and consistent then so is ΨpYq, and ΨpYq ΦpYq.
Proof. Given Φ and ε we enumerate Ψ. We ensure that for all s, every Ψ scomputation arises from a Φ s -computation. We can assume that at most one "axiom" enters Φ at each stage. At stage s ω ck 1 suppose that an axiom pσ, n, αq enters Φ s 1 . Let E s be the inconsistency set of the functional Ψ s tpσ, n, αqu.
This set is ∆ 1 1 open (uniformly in s). We find a clopen set C s rσs such that rσs C s E s and such that λpC s E s q ¤ 2 ¡ppsq ε. We then enumerate into Ψ s 1 axioms which ensure that Ψ s 1 pY, nq α for all Y C s . Since C s rσs, every Ψ s 1 -computation arises from a Φ s 1 -computation; this establishes (1).
Let us see that (2) and (3) are satisfied. Suppose that ΨpYq is consistent, and that n dom ΦpYq; say an axiom pσ, n, αq enters Φ s 1 , where σ Y. If Y C s then n dom ΨpYq. Otherwise, the functional Ψ s tpσ, n, αqu is inconsistent on Y. Since ΨpYq is consistent, this means that Ψ s pY, nqÓ (to some value other than α). But this again implies that n dom ΨpYq. We present a proof of Monin's theorem in a language and notation which is aligned with the rest of this paper. . We want the same thing except to replace A n by open sets. We do this by approximating.
For each n and s find P n,s A n,s , ∆ 1 1 and G δ , such that A n,s ¦ P n,s . Further write P n,s k U n,k,s , with each U n,k,s being a ∆ 1 1 open set. These can
For each s ω ck 1 , X B s implies X G s : otherwise for some n ω, X is an
, as required.
Theorem 3.4 can be restated in the language of forcing. Let P be the partial order consisting of the Π ck 1 sets of positive measure, ordered by inclusion.
Theorem 3.4 implies the following proposition. Recall that for K 2 ω we say that a sufficiently P-generic real is in K if there is a countable collection of dense subsets of P such that for any filter G P meeting these dense sets,
To prove Proposition 3.5 we observe the following (which we will use later as well):
Lemma 3.6. Let K be a countable union of elements of P, and suppose that every element of P intersects K positively (the intersection has positive measure). Then every sufficiently P-generic real is in K.
Note that the union is not required to be uniform.
Proof. If K n F n , with F n P, the dense set is the set of F P such that F F n for some n.
In particular, Lemma 3.6 applies to all open sets (as all nonempty clopen sets are elements of P). And Proposition 3.5 follows from Theorem 3.4, as the
is a union (non-uniform) of elements of P, and it is co-null. We will then improve this result in Theorem 4.3 by solving the cupping question for Π 1 1 -randomness, showing that a non-hyperarithmetic A can be cupped above O by a Π 1 1 -random sequence. However the direct proof of Theorem 4.1 is simpler and we believe is interesting in its own right. Indeed the second proof elaborates on the simpler one. Our proof can be transfered in a straightforward way to the lower setting, simplifying the proof that a non K-trivial is not low for weak 2 randomness [DNWY06] .
The proof is based on a result of Hjorth and Nies: only the ∆ 1 1 sets are low for higher ML-randomness. Here they use full relativisation. That is, they show that if A is not hyperarithmetic then Π 1 1 pAq-ML randomness is strictly stronger than Π 1 1 -ML randomness. This does not use the continuous relativisation introduced in [BGM] (for which the higher K-trivials are indeed low for randomness). Their argument is a dichotomy: either A is not higher K-trivial, in which case the usual arguments show that it is not low for higher ML-randomness; or it is, but in that case it collapses ω ck 1 , which gives it sufficient power to derandomize some Π 1 1 -ML-random reals. One of the effects of the continuous relativisation is to prevent K-trivials from using this extra power. In this section we only use full relativisation.
Our first step is a higher version of Kjos-Hanssen's characterization of lowness for Martin-Löf randomness [KH07] . Given Proposition 3.2, the argument is identical; we give a proof for completeness. Lemma 4.2. Suppose that A is not hyperarithmetic. Let U be a Π Proof. As mentioned, we use the fact that A is not low for Π Chong, Nies and Yu (Together with Slaman and Harrington) [CNY08] proved the following relation between cuppability and lowness: A real is low for Π 1 1 -randomness if and only if it is low for ∆ 1 1 -randomness and is not higher random cuppable. Unfortunately, the equivalence of lowness for Π 1 1 -randomness, and of Π 1 1 -random non-cuppability, with being hyperarithmetic, make this result less interesting. We however have some hope that an analogous characterization (with possibly a similar proof) will find its use with Σ 1 1 -genericity; see Proposition 7.9 below.
The cupping result is very similar to another cupping result of Greenberg,
Miller, Monin and Turetsky [GMMTar] ; they show that if A ¦ LR B then A can be cupped (in the Turing degrees) with B-ML-randoms arbitrarily high.
As usual in the higher setting, we need to deal with the fact that a Π Let us consider the general plan. We are given A which is not hyperarithmetic and some Y 2 ω . We will construct Z as a sequence Yp0qσ 0 Yp1qσ 1 ¤ ¤ ¤ with each rσ n s U, where U is a Π λpP n | τ n q ¡ 0.1 () (where recall that λpR | τq is the conditional probability of R given τ, namely λpR rτsq{2 ¡|τ| ). We start with P 0 2 ω so () holds for n 0. Given τ n , to define σ n we use the following claim, which is identical to one proved in [GMMTar] :
Claim 4.4. Let U be a Π 1 1 set of strings generating U. For any string τ and any Π ck 1 set P such that λpP | τq ¡ 0.1 there is some σ such that σ U and λpP | τσq ¥ 0.8. Proof. First we find an extension ρ of τ such that rρs τU (the latter is of course tτX : X Uu), and such that λpP | ρq ¡ 0.9. This is done with the Lebesgue density theorem. Letting G 2 ω ¡ τU, as λpG | τq ¡ 0.9 and λpP | τq ¡ 0.1, we must have λpG P | τq ¡ 0 and by Lebesgue density theorem there is an extension ρ of τ such that λpG P | ρq ¡ 0.9. In particular we must have λpP | ρq ¡ 0.9 and G rρs is nonempty.
Next we find an extension ν of ρ such that rνs τU and λpP | νq ¥ 0.8 as required. We let Q be the Π ck 1 subset obtained from P rρs by removing all cylinders in which the measure of P drops below 0.8. Formally Now the idea would be to take two steps. First, given τ n , by () and Claim 4.4 we find some σ n such that σ n U and λpP n | τ n σ n q ¥ 0.8. This determines τ n 1 . Then to define P n 1 we consider the next set in a list S 1 , S 2 , . . . of Σ 0 2 sets which are each the union of Π ck 1 sets, co-null, and such that k S k contains only Π 1 1 -random sequences; this is given by Theorem 3.4. We then let P n 1 P n R, where R S n is a Π ck 1 set of sufficiently large measure so that λpP n 1 | τ n σ n q ¥ 0.7. () for n 1 follows.
So far the construction is the same as in [GMMTar] (except that instead of Σ ck 2 sets we use non-uniform unions of Π ck 1 sets. This improvement, and Monin's analysis of forcing with Π 0 1 sets of positive measure, shows that the cupping partner built in that argument can be made not only weakly 2 random but also of hyperimmune-free degree.) However we also need to show that Y ¤ h A Z. In [GMMTar] this is done by using a c.e. antichain which generates U; then at each step the string σ n is made to be an element of that antichain, and is so determined by Z (and using A as an oracle to enumerate this antichain). Here we need a new ingredient. • W ¦ U; and
(As usual, W (and its enumeration) can be obtained uniformly, but we do not use this.) To complete the proof of Theorem 4.3, we relativise Lemma 4.5 to A, apply it to U and ε 0.1, and apply Claim 4.4 to W instead of U; since W ¦ U it is still the case that W intersects all Π ck 1 sets of positive measure.
We further note that applying the lemma we can take σ W: examining the proof of the lemma, we can take ν to be any extension of ρ such that rνs W and rνs Q $ r. The plan then would be to throw τ n W s n out of P n 1 (where σ n W s n 1 ¡ W s n ); this will determine σ n given Z.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let U be a Π 1 1 set of strings generating U. As above we assume that at most one string enters U at each stage. We enumerate W: say Proof of Theorem 4.3. We breifly give the rest of the details. Let W and S 1 , S 2 , . . . as discussed above. We define the sequence σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . as above, which determines τ n . We also let s n be the stage s such that σ n W s 1 ¡ W s . In addition to () we will ensure that for all n, P n 1 τ n W s n r.
() The only modification to the construction discussed above is the definition of P n 1 . Given σ n , because λpW s n | σ n q 0.1, we know that λpP n ¡ τ n W s n | τ n σ n q ¥ 0.7, and we let P n 1 pP n ¡τ n W s n qQ, where Q S n is sufficiently large so that λpP n 1 | τ n σ n q ¥ 0.69; then () still holds, and () as well. Now to recover Y from A Z in a hyperarithmetic way, we observe that no initial segment of Z ¡ τ n is enumerated into W prior to stage s n 1, and so σ n is the first initial segment of Z ¡ τ n enumerated into W. 
(2) ùñ (1): The idea follows the standard Hirschfeldt-Miller construction, which can be described using cost functions. Recall that construction. We are given a ML-random set Z which is captured by some weak 2 test xU n y. This gives an X-computable function t X pnq: the stage at which X enters U n . We want to enumerate a c.e. set A whose settling-time function is bounded by t X . That is, we want Apnq A t X pnq pnq. Hence, enumerating n into A s 1 incurs a cost: in this case, the measure of U n,s . Any c.e. set obeying this cost will be Z-computable. For example, we can allow the e th Friedberg-Muchnik requirement to spend 2 ¡e .
So the alogrithm for enumerating A is: for each e, if the e th requirement is not met already, and we see some n W e,s whose cost is at most 2 ¡e , then we enumerate such n into A s 1 (we insist that n ¥ 2e so that A is co-infinite). The collection of oracles which are wrong on some input forms a Solovay test, and so Z will correctly compute A. The fact that the measure of U n approaches 0 shows that if W e is infinite, then it will get to act, as the cost of large n is always small.
To prove our theorem, we use Theorem 3.4: there is a Π ck 2 set G such that Z G, but Z is not an element of any Π ck 1 subset of G. Say G n U n . The measure of U n may not go to 0, but we know (in the notation of the proof of Theorem 3.4) that G ¡ G ¦ is null. So we let, for n ω and s ω , the e th requirement is already satisfied if A s W e,s $ r. If it is not already satisfied and there is some n ¥ 2e such that cpn, sq ¤ 2 ¡e then we enumerate such n into A s 1 . Define Φpσ, nq A s pnq if rσs U n,s ¡ U n, s . This defines a higher Turing reduction. Certainly ΦpZ, nq Ó for all n. To show that it is wrong only finitely often we enumerate a higher Solovay test xV n y: if n enters A s 1 then we let V n U n,s ¡ F where F G ¦ s is a ∆ 1 1 closed set, chosen so that λpV n q ¤ cpn, sq 2 ¡n (i.e., we choose F such that λpG ¦ s ¡ F q ¤ 2 ¡n ). Note that we cannot take V n U n,s ¡ G ¦ s , as this may not be open. The total weight of the test xV n y is bounded by the sum of°e 2 ¡e (the total costs paid by the requirements enumerating A) and°n 2 ¡n (the excess to the cost that we added to make V n open). If Z V n then as Z G ¦ , it must be that ΦpZ, nq Apnq.
It only remains to show that each requirement is met. Again this is a measure calculation: since λpG ¡ G ¦ q 0, for sufficiently large n, λpU n ¡ G ¦ q is small, and for sufficiently large s, λpG ¦ ¡ G ¦ s q is small as well.
As mentioned above, in [BGM] it is shown that Π 1 1 randomness differs from higher weak 2 randomness. It follows that there is a higher weakly 2 random sequence which higher Turing computes a Π 1 1 set which is not ∆ 1 1 .
Randomness and the higher arithmetic hierarchy
In this section we investigate randomness notions arising from the higher arithmetical hierarchy. For a lightface pointclass Γ, say that a real is Γ-random if it avoids all null sets in Γ. We consider the notions of Π ck n -and Σ ck n -randomness. We will see that we get exactly four randomness notions, linearly ordered by strength: . We let ΦpX, nq s if X U n,s ¡ U n, s . This may be inconsistent because we might see an initial segment of X enter U n , and then a shorter initial segment enter U n later. By Lemma 3.3 and its proof, uniformly in ε ¡ 0 we can modify Φ to a functional Φ ε whose inconsistency set has measure at most ε, but preserving the totality of ΦpZq. The sequence of inconsistency sets of the functionals Φ ε forms a higher ML-test, and so Φ ε pZq is consistent for some ε, and since Z G ω ck 1
, is unbounded in ω For a functional Φ mapping from 2 ω to pω ck 1 q ω , let UpΦq, the unboundedness set of Φ, be the set of X such that ΦpXq is total, consistent and unbounded in ω ck 1 . Note that this set is null. Also let EpΦq be the inconsistency set of Φ. For each ε ¡ 0, using Lemma 3.3 we modify Φ to a functional Φ ε preserving the total and consistent Φ-computations but restricting the inconsistency set to have measure at most ε. By Proposition 5.3, Of course if ΦpXq is total and consistent then αpXq αpXq sup ΦpXq. What we want to do is to describe the set of X such that that αpXq is greater than every computable ordinal. But universal quantification over computable ordinals gives a Σ The set S k is Π ck 2 : beyond totality, to find that X S k , working in L ω ck 1 , we first find an ordinal β isomorphic to R k , and then observe that for some n, ΦpX, nq ¡ β (for some possible value of ΦpX, nq); so beyond totality, this is in fact a Σ ck 1 condition.
The set L k is Σ ck 3 : X L k if and only if there is some m ω such that for all n, for some possible value α n of ΦpX, nq, α n is embeddable into the initial segment R k p¤ mq (the initial segment of R k determined by m); note that this embedding can be found in L ω ck 1 .
Hence, the set S k L k is Σ The intersection 1 randomness, which is strictly weaker than higher weak 2 randomness. As mentioned, every co-null Π ck 3 set must contain a sequence which is not higher weakly 2 random [BGM] , so the set of higher weakly 2 randoms is not Π Proof. We modify the proof of Theorem 5.4. We start with a modification of the direct proof of Lemma 5.2. With every Π ck 2 set G n U n we associate a higher functional Φ, defined as follows: pσ, n, sq Φ if rσs U n,s and λpG s q 0. Now from an effective list G 0 , G 1 , . . . of all Π ck 2 sets we obtain a list of the associated functionals Φ 0 , Φ 1 , . . . . To each functional Φ e and each ε ¡ 0 we apply Lemma 3.3 to obtain a functional Φ e,ε . We then again let H e ε¡0 pUpΦ e,ε q EpΦ e,εand K R e H e , where R is the set of non Π 1 1 -ML-randoms. As in the previous proof, this is Σ ck 5 . We want to show that K is the set of sequences which are not higher weakly 2 random.
In one direction, suppose that X is not higher weakly 2 random. Find some e such that λpG e q 0 and X G e . Since R K, to show that X K we may assume that X is ∆ Since X G e and G e is null, Φ e pXq is total; it will be inconsistent. Let ε ¡ 0. If Φ e,ε pXq is consistent, then by (2) of Lemma 3.3, Φ e,ε pXq is total. Since
, Φ e,ε pXq is unbounded in ω ck 1 . So X UpΦ e,ε q EpΦ e,ε q. It follows that X H e , so X K.
In the other direction, let X K; we show it is not higher weakly 2 random. If X R then we are done. Suppose that X H e for some e. Since we are assuming that X is Π 1 1 -ML-random, there is some ε ¡ 0 such that X EpΦ e,ε q; so X UpΦ e,ε q. The fact that Φ e,ε pXq is unbounded in ω ck 1 implies that for all s ω ck We start by proving implications and equivalences; then we prove the analogue of Theorem 2.1; and then separate between the three genericity notions. We will end the section by giving a characterisation of Σ 1 1 -genericity using finitechange dense sets.
6.1. Implications. be a higher effective enumeration of a Π 1 1 set of strings U generating U. By restraining some strings from entering U, we can modify the set U and its enumeration to ensure that for all s ω ck 1 , for all σ U s , no proper extension of σ is enumerated into U s 1 . () As usual we also assume that at most one string is enumerated at each stage. Let F be the set of strings, no extension of which is ever enumerated into U. The set F is Σ 1 1 . It is dense: suppose that σ F. Let s be the least stage at which some extension of σ is enumerated into U; say that extension is τ. Then no proper extension of τ is ever enumerated into U, so for example τ0 F. Finally, suppose that σ F. If some predecessor ρ of σ is in U then rσs U. Otherwise, by definition of F, rσs is a subset of the complement of U. Hence every sequence meeting F , also meets or avoids U.
We next use Proposition 6.1 to show the following: Proposition 6.2. Weak Σ strings which have no extension in F is Π 1 1 : if every extension of σ is eventually extracted from F, we will see this at a computable stage. If G meets W then it avoids F . Otherwise it avoids W: there is some σ G with no extension in W; this means that F is dense in rσs. Since G is weakly Σ 1 1 -generic and σ G, it must meet F . The other direction of Theorem 6.3 is an effectivisation of Feferman's proof. We first give the proof in modern set-theoretic terminology.
Preserving
Proof of the other direction of Theorem 6.3. We consider the standard, settheoretic forcing language and forcing relation for Cohen forcing, as interpreted in L ω ck 1
. We use the fact that Cohen forcing is a set forcing in this model (unlike for example forcing with ∆ 1 1 sets of positive measure, or hyperarithmetic Sacks forcing). By induction on the complexity of formulas we see that for the classes Γ ∆ 0 , Π 1 , Σ 1 , for any formula ϕ Γ in the forcing language, the
. Further, the proof of the forcing theorem holds for these levels; if G is Σ By assumption, G does not meet n F n , and so it avoids it; say p G has no extension in n F n . This means that for all n, densely below p we can find conditions which force some value α ω ck 1 such that ϕpn, αq holds. By admissibility (ranging over the extensions of p and of n), there is some γ ω ck 1 such that for each n, densely below p we can find conditions which force that ϕpn, αq holds for some α γ. That is, p forces that for all n ω there is some α γ such that ϕpn, αq holds. But this is a ∆ 0 statement, and so holds in L ω ck 1 rGs.
For the benefit of computability-oriented readers who may be uncomfortable with forcing over models of KP, we translate the proof to the language of computability. The proof resembles the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof of the other direction of Theorem 6.3. Let G be Σ Here we use the notation of the proof of Theorem 3.4. As in that proof, we let A n,α be the set of oracles X such that Ψ X p¤ nq is isomorphic to an ordinal shorter than α; we let A n A n,ω open set U which is equivalent to K in category; that is, K U is meagre. As G is ∆ 1 1 -generic, G K iff G U. We apply this to the sets A n,α to get open sets U n,α . For each n, U n α ω ck 1 U n,α is Π 1 1 -open. We assume that for all n, G A n , and so G U n .
Let F be the interior of the complement of n U n . This is a Σ 1 1 -open set, and G does not meet it; so G avoids it. This means that there is some σ G sucht that n U n is dense in rσs. By admissibility of ω ck 1 , there is some α ω ck 1 such that n U n,α is dense in rσs; in other words each U n,α is dense in rσs. Again as G is ∆ 1 1 -generic, we see that G n U n,α , so G n A n,α , as required.
6.3. Separations. We now turn to the separations between the three notions of genericity we have analysed so far. These separations in fact are not difficult. . Such a function is higher ω-c.a. if the number of mind-changes of the approximation is finite and furthermore hyperarithmetically bounded. An important fact proved in [BGM] is that any higher ω-c.a. function collapses ω We note a difference between randomness and genericity here. Above we showed that a ∆ Proof. Using Theorem 6.3, the proof is essentially the proof of the first direction of that theorem. Let G be a ∆ 6.4. Finite-change dense sets. As discussed in the introduction, some of the analogy between higher and lower genericity breaks down when considering relativisation. As in the higher setting, Π Proof. In one direction, we observe that all dense Σ For the latter, we show that every string in F extends some string in the range of f . For let τ F. ω . There is some r s such that τ f t pσq is constant for all t rr, sq. This is immeidate if s is a successor ordinal (let r s¡1); if s is a limit ordinal, we use the fact that the approximation xf t y is finite-change. This means that τ and all of its extensions are elements of trr,sq F t . Now by induction, t r F t is dense; let ρ be an extension of τ in Actually, the proof above directly gives the equivalence of weak Σ 1 1 -genericity and genericity for dense finite-change sets. This in turn implies Proposition 6.1; it is not too difficult to see that if W is Π 1 1 , then the union of W and the interior of its complement is dense finite-change (let f pσq σ until we see an extension in W; so we change f pσq at most once). We can thus use this characterisation to give an alternative proof of Proposition 6.2.
Lowness for higher genericity
We consider lowness and cupping for the genericity notions investigated above. The definition of lowness is the same as for randomness: an oracle A is low for Γ-genericity if every Γ-generic sequence is also ΓpAq-generic. As for randomness here we use full relativisations. -genericity. Lowness is related to cupping. The PosnerRobinson theorem [PR81] states that for any noncomputable A and any X there is a 1-generic G such that X ¤ T A G. This implies that lowness for 1-genericity coincides with being computable (see [Yu06] ). The analogy between 1-genericity and Π [GM09] showed that lowness for weak 1-genericity and lowness for Kurtz randomness coincided. In the higher setting, lowness for higher Kurtz randomness (Π ck 1 -randomness, also equivalent to ∆ 1 1 -Kurtz randomness) has been settled by Kjos-Hanssen, Nies, Stephan and Yu [KHNSY10] , who showed it conicided with being both ∆ 1 1 -dominated and ∆ 1 1 -semi-traceable. All of this would lead us to expect that lowness for ∆ 1 1 -genericity has the same characterisation. This is indeed the case, as we show here. This fact was also known to Kihara (unpublished). 2. X is low for weak 1-genericity.
Greenberg and Miller
3. X is computably dominated and semi-traceable.
Their argument is (1) Ñ (2) Ñ (3) Ñ (1). For (2) Ñ (3), they use the fact that every Turing degree which is not computably dominated computes a weakly 1-generic sequence. The higher analogue of this fact fails, as was shown by Kihara [Kih] : he constructs a function f dominated by no ∆ 1 1 function such that there is no
Thus we need a new argument. What we do is independently prove the equivalence of the higher analogues of (1) and (3) (Proposition 7.5) and then the equivalence of the higher analogues of (1) and (2) (Theorem 7.6). The latter is a general argument which holds in the lower setting as well, giving directly the equivalence of lowness for weak 1-genericity and lowness for dense c.e. open sets. The higher analogue of (1) is being low for ∆ We first want to show that f is dominated by a ∆ 1 1 function g. For this we may assume that f is non-decreasing and that f pnq ¡ 0 for all n. Let W 2 σ0
Let V be a ∆ n for m n it must be the case that τ extends a string σ0 f p|σ|q for some σ ¥ 1 n . This shows that for every n we have gpnq ¥ f pnq.
Next, we show that f is infinitely often equal to some ∆ 1 1 function h. Again, for simplicity, we may asssume that f pnq ¥ 1 for all n.
The function b is injective. As 0 0 is the empty string, the range of b is the collection of finite binary strings ending with a 1 (together with the empty sequence). Now define
Let V be a ∆ 1 1 set of strings such that every string in V extends a string in W.
Effectively from V, given any lower bound m, we can obtain some n ¡ m and a function ρ : n Ñ ω such that ρpkq f pkq for some k ¥ m. Given this, the construction of the function h is done by recursion; if h is defined up to some m, then we find ρ with lower bound m, and extend by copying the values (beyond m) given by ρ.
Given m, we find some τ V which extends the string 1 m . Let ρ b ¡1 pτ1q. The string τ extends bppρae k qˆfpkqq for some k; so ρpkq f pkq. And k ¥ m, as we assumed that f ¥ 1, and ρae m 0 m . Theorem 7.6. An oracle is low for ∆ ¤ ¤ ¤ σ n σ be all the prefixes of σ of length k i for i ¤ n. Put in V n 1 a string τ ¥ σ such that rτs U σ 0 U ¤ ¤ ¤ σ n U (here recall that σU tσˆY : Y Uu).
Finally let k n 1 be the longest length among the lengths of the strings in V n 1 .
Let V n V n . By construction, V is dense. Let us prove that for every string σ the set V rσs contains no ∆ 1 1 open set dense in rσs. Let n be the smallest such that k n is bigger than |σ|. It is enough to prove that for any extension τ of σ of length k n , the set V rτs contains no ∆ What we need to argue is that everything stabilises with only finitely many mind-changes. But this follows from xf s y being finite-change. Suppose that on an interval I of stages, the values k i,s are stable for i ¤ n and the values g s pσq are stable for every σ of length at most k n¡1,s . Then on this interval I, for each string σ of length k n,s , each value g s pσq can change at most finitely often (by induction, f n pσq changes finitely often; then f n¡1 pf n pσqq changes finitely often, and so on). Since there are only finitely many strings of length k n,s , we see that k n 1,s changes only finitely often.
As every Σ F Q is nonempty (it contains G) and Σ The closest result to date is by Chong and Yu [CY] : if Q and P are uncountable Σ 1. Z is captured by a set F n U n with λpF U n q ¤ 2 ¡n , where F is Π ck 1 and each U n is Σ ck 1 (uniformly in n).
Z higher Turing computes Kleene's O.
We shall see an analogous characterisation for Π Φ. By Lemma 3.3, uniformly in ε ¡ 0 we find a higher functional Φ ε such that Φ ε pXq A and the measure of the inconsistency set of Φ ε is at most ε.
Let xY s y be a higher effective enumeration of A. For ε ¡ 0 and n ω we let U n,ε
ε pA s ae n q tZ 2 ω : hs rY s ae n ¤ Φ ε pZqsu and let G n,ε U n,ε . We also let F be the set of oracles Z such that ΦpZq does not lie to the left of A:
F tZ 2 ω : 2h n pΦpZ, nq 0 & Apnq 1qu . The set F G contains X, and is null. To see the latter, let Z F G. Either Φ ε pZq is inconsistent for all ε. There are only null many such oracles. Otherwise, for some ε ¡ 0, Φ ε pZq A. Since A is not hyperarithmetic, there are only null many oracles which higher compute A (the usual majority-vote argument holds, but we can also appeal to Sacks' theorem [Sac90, IV.2.4], which says that upper cones in the hyperdegrees are null).
(1) ùñ (2) is immediate. Proposition 8.3. The nested tests of the form xU f pnq y where λpU f pn¤ 2 ¡n and f has a finite-change approximation, precisely capture non higher weak 2-randoms.
We now give a notion of test for Π 1 1 -randomness, which has the same flavour as Proposition 8.3. Whereas Proposition 8.3 can be seen as a generalization that no sequence with a closed approximation is higher weak 2-random, the following characterisation of Π 1 1 -randomness can be seen as a generalisation of the fact that no sequence with a collapsing approximation is Π restricted to the stages s such that X U f s pnq , changes finitely often.
Proof. (2) ùñ (1): This is the easy direction. Let n U f pnq be a test which captures some X following the hypothesis of (2) . Note that we can always suppose that the approximation of f is partially continuous, that is for s limit, if the limit of xf t y t s exists, then it is also equal to f s . We can also always suppose that λpU f s pn¤ 2 ¡n for any s and n, as it is harmless to trim U f s pnq if its measure becomes too big. Define g : ω Ñ ω (1) ùñ (2) : Suppose that X is not Π 1 1 -random. If X is not Π 1 1 -ML-random then (2) holds easily. Otherwise we use Theorem 4.6 again. The sequence X higher Turing computes some non-hyperarithmetic, Π 1 1 set A, say via some functional Φ; we define the functionals Φ ε as above; we assume that the measure of the inconsistency set of Φ ε is strictly smaller than ε. Let, for ε ¡ 0 and σ 2 ω , Wpε, σq Φ ¡1 ε rσs.
For n ω and s ω 
